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DEMOCRACY AS THE RULE OF A SMALL MANY
Jamie Terence Kelly
ABSTRACT: What is the optimal size of a democratic society? While not taking
an explicit stand on this issue, Hélène Landemore’s model of democracy in
Democratic Reason suggests that democracies ought to be small, certainly smaller
than many existing states. If, as Landemore argues, we must rely on the random
selection of representatives, then we should be concerned about both the size of the
population and the way cognitive diversity is distributed within it. Given the
realities of party politics and media framing, this means that smaller political
societies will yield wiser decisions than very large ones.
In Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many
(Princeton University Press, 2013), Hélène Landemore presents an
exciting and insightful defense of democratic government that focuses
on the importance of cognitive diversity for good collective decision
making. According to Landemore, “democracy is a smart collective
decision-making procedure that taps into the intelligence of the people
as a group in ways that can even, under the right conditions, make it
smarter than alternative regimes such as the rule of the one and the rule
of the few” (1). Landemore’s model of democracy thus emphasizes the
need to cultivate and mobilize diverse cognitive models within demo-
cracies and deploy these within decision-making institutions.
Jamie Terence Kelly, jamkelly@vassar.edu, Department of Philosophy, Vassar College,
Poughkeepsie, NY, 12604-0736, the author of Framing Democracy: A Behavioral Approach to
Democratic Theory (Princeton, 2012), thanks the participants in the “Is Democracy Desirable?”
conference at the University of Texas, Austin (January 2014), for helpful comments and
discussion.
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In this symposium paper, I want to ask a question about size. How
large—and, more importantly, how small—must democracies be to
manifest collective intelligence? This is an old question, but one that has
recently drifted from the forefront of theoretical debates.1 One of the
virtues of Landemore’s book is that it allows many such questions to
reemerge into philosophical debates about democracy. Her answer, I will
argue, should be that democracies must be small, at least far smaller than
modern mass democracies currently are. Before we can understand
Landemore’s contribution to answering this question, however, we must
first analyze how she understands cognitive diversity, and then wrestle
with the most radical proposal she sets forth in Democratic Reason: the
random selection of political representatives.
Cognitive Diversity
Drawing on the work of Scott Page (2008), Landemore (89-90) under-
stands cognitive diversity in terms of the variety of heuristics, interpreta-
tions, and predictive models people use to solve problems. Thus, a given
group is made more cognitively diverse by adding members who make
use of different tools to address problems or make predictions.
Cognitive diversity . . . is roughly the fact that people make predictions
based on different models of the way the world works or should be
interpreted. Cognitive diversity ensures that votes (or predictions) are not
independent but, on the contrary, negatively correlated. The good thing
about negative correlation of this type is that it guarantees that where one
voter makes a mistake, another is likely to get it right, and vice versa. In
the aggregate, therefore, mistakes cancel each other out not randomly but
systematically. (160)
Given the recent trend in democratic theory toward epistemic
justifications of democracy,2 Landemore’s most important contribution
to current debates in democratic theory consists in providing a framework
for thinking about how cognitive diversity can bolster epistemic
arguments for democracy. While it has long been granted that individual
epistemic competence is a key variable in assessing the reliability of
democratic decision making, the role of cognitive diversity has been
largely overlooked.3 Landemore claims that not only is cognitive diversity

































in fact more important than individual epistemic ability. Thus, the
Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem:
The general point of the Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem is that it is
often better to have a group of cognitively diverse people than a group of
very smart people who think alike. This is because whereas very smart
people sharing local optima will tend to get stuck quickly on their highest
local common optimum, a more cognitively diverse group has the
possibility of guiding each other beyond that local optimum toward the
global optimum. (103)
Landemore makes productive use here of the 1957 film “Twelve
Angry Men” to show how a diverse group can do better at reaching the
truth than a group with higher average ability but less diversity. I have no
quarrel with her conclusions in this area, but I do want to make a point
about the methodology here: we are using insights from the decisions of
small groups (cf. claims about mazes in Chapter One and Landemore’s use
of the 1997 horror film “Cube”) to generalize about the nature of
democratic institutions. This is true not only of Landemore’s examples
and intuition-pumps, but also seems to reflect the structure of the
empirical results upon which she bases her argument. This evidence, as I
understand it, builds complex computational models on the foundation of
decision-making behavior observed in relatively small groups.
Given the difficulty involved in testing the accuracy of large-scale
institutions and groups, this is unsurprising. It should be noted, however,
that there are limits to how much we can learn about the decision
making of large, complex societies by studying puzzle-solving activities
of small groups. As a result, I think we ought to be somewhat more
conservative than Landemore is in making extrapolations about large-
scale, democratic decision making from data that concerns the behavior
of juries, teams, or even large committees. I will not dwell on these
concerns here, however. Instead, I want to focus on a significantly more
ambitious claim that Landemore makes on the basis of the above insights,
her Numbers Trump Ability Theorem:
I hypothesize, very simply, that the advantage of involving large numbers
is that it automatically ensures greater cognitive diversity. In that sense,
more is smarter, at least up to the point of deliberative feasibility.
(104)
































Here, Landemore claims that cognitive diversity positively correlates
with numbers. In absolute terms, this seems plausible. That is, as we
expand the size of a group, we should eventually expect to scoop up
more individuals with different cognitive models. My concern is that the
absolute number of different cognitive models doesn’t seem as important
to Landemore’s argument as the way cognitive diversity is distributed
within a population. In order for her Numbers Trump Ability Theorem
to be plausible, I will argue, we must assume that cognitive models are
evenly distributed. As I will attempt to show later, there are empirical
reasons for doubting this will be the case. Before I get to that argument,
however, we need to see how the above insights about cognitive
diversity structure Landemore’s model of democracy.
Random Selection
One of the most striking things about Landemore’s epistemic argument
in favor of democracy is that it implies that elections ought to have no
central place in democratic government. On Landemore’s account, the
benefits of cognitive diversity must be brought to bear on deliberation,
and this is possible only if we reject the election of representatives in
favor of random selection. She states:
In practice, elections tend to bring to power socially and economically
homogenous people, suggesting that the assembly is not likely to be as
cognitively diverse as it should. Even in theory, though, it is not clear that
the principle of election can be fully reconciled with the goal of cognitive
diversity, as there might be a selection bias in the pool of people likely to
run in the first place. (108)
The argument here laments the fact that the electoral process cannot be
relied upon to reproduce the diversity of the larger group. Elections, in
virtue of the self-selection of candidates and the effects of political
competition, seem destined to produce representatives that are less
cognitively diverse than the groups they are tasked to represent. For
Landemore this is a major failing of elections because her model of
democratic government relies upon fruitful deliberation among a
cognitively diverse group to generate collectively wise decisions. If
elections are systematically incapable of reproducing sufficient cognitive
diversity, then some other method of selection is required. Landemore

































impractical and undesirable (110-11). Instead, she advocates the random
selection of representatives.
Building on the model of ancient Athens,4 Landemore argues that
fruitful democratic deliberation requires the selection of representatives
by lot. It should be noted, however, that the Athenian model of
democracy operated on a much smaller scale than most modern states.
Estimates vary, but it seems plausible to assume that for most of its
existence, there were between 30,000 and 50,000 Athenian citizens
(Ober 2008, 141). Even at that scale, generating inclusive and effective
deliberation is no easy feat, but it should be remarked that the
challenges and advantages posed by random selection in Athens were
significantly different than they would be in a country like the United
States. Most obviously, all or most Athenian citizens could reasonably
expect to hold some important political office at some point in their
lives. Given limits to the number of representatives that can produc-
tively deliberate (this is what Landemore means by “deliberative
feasibility” above), such expectations would be massively diminished
in contemporary states.
As a result, we ought to recognize just how radical a proposal this is:
Democracy on Landemore’s account would require a profound reshaping
of how citizens think about political participation and equality. Indeed, in
order for her argument to be convincing, I think we would have to
completely reconsider the appropriate scale of democratic societies.
My concern with Landemore’s epistemic argument for democracy is
that in the long run, random sampling will prove successful in selecting a
cognitively diverse set of representatives only if cognitivemodels are evenly
distributed within its population. Random selection from a group with a
large number of individual cognitive models will not generate inclusive
deliberation if that large number is swamped by a majority or plurality who
share a single or a few models. Put another way, a large cognitively
homogenous group with all of its diversity packed into a tiny cluster will
not be amenable to random selection of representatives. Instead, what
Landemore needs is a group that has a large number of cognitive models
that are all fairly evenly distributed throughout the population.
Thus, enlarging the size of the group is not a reliable means of increasing
the cognitive diversity of the assembly, unless we also assume that each
cognitive model has a roughly equal probability of being selected. That is,
for the Numbers Trump Ability Theorem to be plausible, we must assume
that cognitive models are evenly distributed within the population. As a
































merely conceptual matter, that needn’t be the case. For example, we
can imagine a very large group where every possible cognitive model is
represented by at least one individual, but where 99.99 percent of the
population shares the same cognitive model.5 If we randomly select
representatives from that group, we should (in the long run, at least)
expect to generate a cognitively homogeneous assembly. This is in spite
of the fact that this group is—in one sense—cognitively diverse (i.e., it
possesses at least one token of every possible type of cognitive model).
The problem here is that the probability of selecting a representative
from the homogeneous group is so much larger than the probability of
selecting any one of the diversity-generating models that random
selection fails to provide a reliable means of generating a diverse
assembly.
What matters, therefore, is not just the size of the group, but also the
distribution of cognitive models. Once we see this, we must acknow-
ledge that sometimes a smaller group with a more even distribution of
cognitive models will prove a better source of representatives than some
larger group (even if it has a higher absolute number of cognitive
models). In the next section, I will argue that, given the realities of mass
politics and party democracy, we should not expect cognitive diversity to
be evenly distributed in very large societies.
The Limits of Large Numbers
In this section I provide empirical reasons for doubting that cognitive
models will be evenly distributed in very large democratic societies. To
make this empirical case, I draw on my own work on framing effects
(Kelly 2012). Further, I suggest that this insight should lead Landemore
to favor small democratic societies. Thus, on her account, democracy
ought to be understood as the rule of a small many.
To recall, Landemore (104) claims that
Under the right conditions and all things being equal otherwise,
what matters most to the collective intelligence of a problem-solving
group is not so much individual ability as the number of people in the
group.
The nature of political framing and the existence of powerful groups
influencing politics, I argue, reveal that the ceteris paribus clause quoted

































such democracies do not (and likely cannot) sustain the sort of cognitive
diversity required for random selection to generate wise assemblies.
Perhaps in small democracies like Switzerland it is possible to mobilize
cognitive diversity in the way Landemore requires, but huge societies
like the United States seem incapable of distributing high levels of
cognitive diversity in that way. To see this, consider the way political
framing operates in modern mass democracies.
In general, I understand a frame to be a particular way of presenting a
question or problem. Thus, political frames represent different inter-
pretations of a given political issue. For example, decisions about enacting
affirmative-action policies can be framed either in terms of preferential
treatment or reverse discrimination.6 Although these are just different
ways of presenting the same policy question, they can lead to very
different responses and decisions. In this way, we see that the framing of a
political issue can have important political consequences: Since different
frames tend to highlight different considerations or concerns, they often
lead individuals to substantively different conclusions regarding which
decision is appropriate.7 Although the link between cognitive diversity
and framing effects is somewhat complicated,8 I assert that the diversity of
frames is importantly connected to the sort of cognitive diversity that
concerns Landemore, and that the diversity of frames in a population will
have important consequences for her argument.
Indeed, it seems that diverse frames constitute part of what Landemore
(233) refers to as the “the toolbox of democratic reason.” That is,
diversity of frames is an important precondition for the cognitive
diversity upon which her argument relies. It should be noted, however,
that there will be a finite number of viable frames for any given political
issue, and that as a result, there is an upper bound to the amount of
diversity that could be fostered in any given society. There are, for
example, only so many ways that we can productively recast the
affirmative-action debate. Surely there are more than just the frames
outlined above,9 but past a certain point frames for a given issue will
become redundant, vacuous, or confused. Thus, while cultivating a
diversity of frames for political issues appears to be a worthwhile goal of
liberal societies, a determination to augment the number of individual
frames beyond limit is surely a fool’s errand. What we want is enough
diversity to cast productive light on the important issues in question, but
there will be diminishing returns to the further proliferation of frames.
































These theoretical limits to the number of possible frames for political
issues are compounded by practical limitations on the dissemination of
frames. As it stands, there are a limited number of institutions in society
that are effective in disseminating political frames. Most obviously,
political parties and media entities are currently the primary groups
responsible for disseminating frames for political issues.10 Political parties
devote significant resources to the development, testing, and dissemina-
tion of frames. Through polls, surveys, focus groups, and sophisticated
advertising campaigns, political parties seek to develop frames for political
issues that will sway voters toward their political positions and candidates.
They do this in order to increase their political power, but also to ensure
a certain uniformity of political positions across a large and varied field of
candidates. Political parties exert a significant amount of control over
political frames, and they have a vested interest in disseminating only
those frames that serve their political interests.11
Media entities also develop frames for political issues and serve to
disseminate them on a mass scale. Their interest in these tasks stems partly
from a desire to present political issues to the public in a coherent and
insightful way, but also from their interest in entertaining their audience
and expanding their market share. As a result, media entities (whether
print, broadcast, or Internet) should be expected to exert significant power
over the dissemination of political frames in a given society. Media frames
of course interact with frames derived from political parties, educational
institutions, and other interest groups, but the power of media entities in
determining the group of frames circulating in a population will be
significant. Since media entities pick up on only a small subset of the total
number of possible frames for political issues and reproduce these very
widely, it stands to reason that they have an important impact on the
amount of cognitive diversity found in any given society.
I think we can draw some important inferences about the diversity of
cognitive models in democratic societies from the framing of political
issues. In particular, I think we can see why smaller democracies will
have more of the sort of diversity that Landemore requires. Within a
small society, it should be possible to approach the theoretical limit on
feasible frames by establishing liberal social and educational institutions.
Beyond that, however, political parties and media entities should be
expected to select out just a small number of frames and disseminate
them widely. It thus seems predictable that mass democracies will have a

































frames are relegated to the margins. Thus, the mechanics of mass politics
would seem to skew the distribution of frames in a way that threatens the
epistemic value of democracy. Once we reach a size capable of sustaining
the full diversity of viable frames, further growth in the size of the
electorate (at least in the presence of political parties and the media)
seems to put downward pressure on the diversity of frames.
Just as mass democracies skew the distribution of political frames
toward just a small subset of all those available, I think that large
democracies will be similarly incapable of ensuring the even distribution
of cognitive models that Landemore’s argument requires. Indeed,
Landemore recognizes a version of this problem when discussing the
use of large-scale referenda in political societies:
There is probably an upper limit to the number of cluster interpretations
that can be used, which would seem to mean that the cognitive model
does not, at least not straightforwardly, support the epistemic properties of
majority rule past a certain threshold, since the impossibility of introdu-
cing new cluster interpretations may result in positive correlations
between judgments that can harm the epistemic properties of judgment
aggregation. (163)
In that case, she seems to agree that majority rule will be unable to work
in large populations, and this is why she prefers to constrain its use to
post-deliberative voting by representatives. Later she writes:
In other words, although Hong and Page’s results do seem to speak against
too much confidence in the epistemic properties of mass scale elections
and referenda, the question of the possibly diminishing epistemic return of
greater inclusiveness in voting need not arise for standard representative
assemblies. (164)
Despite recognizing the problem posed here by the finite number of
interpretations possible in a given society, Landemore appears to think
that this difficulty afflicts only systems of majority rule. Since, on her
account, representative assemblies are to be selected randomly, she
appears to think that while there must be an upper bound to the proper
size of assemblies, no similar bound applies to the size of the demos itself.
But this is not the case. As I hope I have shown, random selection is
effective for her purposes only if cognitive diversity is distributed in the
right way. In particular, random selection will be effective only if there
are a large number of cognitive models that all have a roughly equal
































chance of being selected. If only one or two models are widespread in a
population, and the remaining models have a low probability of being
selected, then random selection (at least in the long run) should be
expected to produce a relatively homogeneous group of representatives.
My worry is that once we scale up past a certain point, the homogenizing
effect of political campaigning and media framing will begin to undermine
the cognitive diversity found in smaller groups.
Decentralization as a Solution
If Landemore’s argument is correct, then under the right conditions,
cognitive diversity provides a compelling reason to prefer rule of the
many to rule of the few. One question that remains unaddressed by
Landemore, however, is which “many” should rule.12 If my arguments
above are correct, then Landemore’s answer (as hinted at by her reliance
on the example of Athenian democracy) must be that democracy ought
to be the rule of a small many.
Before I conclude, however, I should anticipate a reply. Perhaps we
cannot immediately conclude that assemblies will be insufficiently diverse
for the purposes of Landemore’s argument merely because the overall
size of the demos is large. Instead, we can imagine a very large demos
where authority is consistently delegated downward (e.g., to states,
provinces, or cantons). If the overall demos is subdivided into smaller,
self-governing groups, then maybe assemblies selected from these smaller
groups may be able to mobilize the epistemically beneficial effects of
cognitive diversity. Thus, my argument above regarding the proper size of
democracies seems to simply assume a particular stance in the debate
between federalism and state sovereignty.13 However, in order to
cultivate the right distribution of cognitive diversity, decentralization of
power would have to reduce the effect of mass politics across the whole
population. That is, we would still need to know how to constrain the
homogenizing influence of mass politics across localities. If political parties
and media entities continue to dominate political discussion across the
whole demos, it is not clear why we should be more confident in the
distribution of cognitive diversity within states, provinces, or cantons than
across the entire population.
Thus, the lesson of Landemore’s argument appears to be that we still
need to think quite a bit harder about what sorts of institutions and


































1. For a concise history of this debate, see chapter 1 of Dahl and Tufte 1973.
2. David Estlund’s Democratic Authority (2009) represents an important milestone in
this “epistemic turn,” but a number of distinct trends in the literature have been
moving in a similar direction. See for example Anderson 2006 and Talisse 2009.
3. Landemore’s selective genealogy of epistemic considerations in democratic
theory points out some important exceptions (ch. 3).
4. For thorough studies of Athenian democracy that seem to support Landemore’s
argument, see Woodruff 2005 and Ober 2008.
5. I assume here that there are a finite number of different cognitive models. Thus,
there is a limit to how much cognitive diversity is possible. As I show in the next
section, Landemore also seems to endorse this claim.
6. This example is taken from Bartels 2003.
7. The most famous example of this is the “Asian Disease” experiment (Tversky
and Kahneman 1981).
8. It should be clear that cognitive diversity is a much broader notion, and I do not
mean here to equate such diversity with the diversity of frames. I do expect,
however, that there will be an important relationship between the two.
9. For a better way of framing this issue, see Anderson 2002.
10. Recently, in the Unites States, a third such entity has emerged: political-action
committees. I am grateful to Joseph Fishkin for pointing this out. Although this
is an important issue, I am not yet sure what sort of effect such groups will have,
and will not treat them in what follows.
11. Whether political parties would see their influence lessened in Landemore’s
model is an interesting question. Surely, the abandonment of elections would
change the character of party politics, but it is unclear whether parties would
have their power significantly reduced. Since parties would still have an interest
in disseminating frames and standardizing messages (in order to influence anyone
who may eventually become a political representative), I assume that they would
continue to play an important role in democratic societies.
12. To be clear, Landemore is deliberately agnostic on this question. For example,
see her reference to “the demos (however the latter is defined)” (117).
13. On this issue, see the work of Heather Gerken (2010) and Ilya Somin (2013).
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